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ABSTRACT
A study was conducted of the results of the first year of
operation of Boston's job training linkage program, a new method
of funding and providing job training and related social
services. Two individual programs were selected from the group
of programs that were funded in the initial year of the program
(1989), and their performances were analyzed for the presence or
absence of the essential characteristics that jobs linkage
programs should possess in order to be most effective. The
purpose of the study was to determine whether an approach to
funding and providing job training which used the linkage
mechanism could improve upon the impact that federally-sponsored
training efforts were having on preparing individuals for
positions with the city's private employers.
The results of the study indicate that Boston's job training
linkage program is a new strategy for funding and providing job
training and related social services. The unique qualities of
the linkage mechanism-- local control, flexible programming,
research capacity, less punitive funding measures-- contribute to
the program's ability to be used jointly by developers and
employment training professionals to create effective training
programs. If the program is managed responsibly over time, the
program can also contribute to the city's efforts at addressing
larger economic issues, such as structural unemployment.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence Susskind
Title: Professor, Department of Urban
Studies and Planning
CHAPTER ONE: A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED EMPLOYMENT
TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES
The federal government has spent a considerable amount of time
and energy trying to determine how to best design and administer
programs that would effectively provide education and skills
training to segments of the workforce whose likelihood of
becoming employed would be enhanced through such efforts. Ever
since the federal government first took a leadership role in
developing employment programs for millions of unemployed workers
during the Depression, many different types of programs have been
developed. Some programs tried to change the individual so that
he or she might fit into the social and economic system more
effectively; others tried to change institutions to better
accommodate the needs of individuals (Franklin and Ripley 1984,
6). Both of these approaches provided the theoretical framework
for several different programs that were developed at different
times throughout the last 60 sixty years.
Efforts focused on helping the individual included the
vocational education programs that were offered through the
public school system (Clague and Kramer 1976, 29). Vocational
educational programs aimed to "strengthen the occupational
preparation of young people who [did] not enroll in college, and
reduce the flow of unskilled, ill-prepared youths into the labor
market" (Ibid.). By contrast, examples of programs that tried to
improve institutions were those developed under the Economic
Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964. The philosophy behind the Act was
that "remedial education, training, and work experience were
necessary prerequisites for satisfactory employment" (Levitan,
Mangum and Marshall 1972, 308). One program developed under
this Act was "New Careers". New Careers was created in 1969 to
"prepare disadvantaged adults for paraprofessional jobs in
critically undermanned public and non-profit fields" (Clague and
Kramer, 27). Unfortunately, problems arose with the
implementation of this program because of the "reluctance of
employing institutions and professional workers ... to
restructure jobs and career hierarchies to allow for the
positions of paraprofessionals" (Ibid., 28). Although it was not
a training or educational program, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and similar political interventions into the free working of the
labor market, was also designed to change the practices of
institutions by making it illegal to engage in hiring and other
business practices that were racially discriminatory.
Even though a variety of programs have been developed, some
more successful than others at reducing unemployment, program
goals has remained consistent over the years: to prepare the
population to meet the needs of the labor market (Franklin and
Ripley, 3).
Full Employment Policies
One of the earliest federally-sponsored employment programs was
the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC). This program was
established by the Roosevelt administration in 1933, at the
"bottom" of the Depression, when a full quarter of the American
labor force was without jobs (Gordon 1967, 45). Under the CCC,
"more than 1,500 work camps were established, and unmarried men
aged 18-25 years of age were enrolled to work on conservation and
construction projects planned by the Department of Agriculture
and Interior" (Clague and Kramer, 3).
In 1935 the Works Projects Administration (WPA) was
established. The creation of the WPA was very significant in
terms of providing models for future employment training policies
and programs in the United States.
As of that moment in time [when the WPA was established],
the federal government assumed nationwide responsibility for
the alleviation of unemployment; it began to foster job
creation, training for jobs, economic stability, and all the
other requirements of what later came to be termed full
employment (Ibid., 4).
According to Robert A. Gordon, author of The Goal of Full
Employment, "from the point of view of achieving full employment,
the inadequacy of [the CCC and the WPA was] reflected in the fact
that at the end of the 1930s, the national [aggregate]
unemployment rate was still in the neighborhood of 15 per cent"
(p. 46). But, a 15 per cent aggregate unemployment rate was
good relative to the aggregate unemployment rate of 24% in 1932,
the year before the CCC was established (p. 47). Therefore, even
though these programs offered jobs for which the government
intervened to create demand because the market could not,
aggregate unemployment was positively impacted.
It is important to note that the decision to commit a
substantial amount of federal money to a national employment
training effort during the Depression was not made without
debate. In order to garner support for a heightened role for
government in this area, policy makers had to be explicit about
their motivations for "interfering" with the free working of the
labor market. Interference on the side of the growing number of
unemployed was ultimately rationalized as a temporary way to
"counteract a [severe] slump in the nation's business cycle"
(Franklin and Ripley, 15). Prior to federal involvement in this
area, "the reigning ideology in the United States about the
importance of "free enterprise" and of limiting governmental
interference with business, inhibited the development of
comprehensive and consistent employment and training efforts"
(Ibid., 3).
After the Depression, there was disagreement about how the
federal government should balance the relatively new economic
policy goal of full aggregate employment with the desire for
rapid economic growth and stable prices, or inflation, and
precisely what combination of policies and programs should be
used to achieve a balance (Gordon, 17). Because of the inverse
relationship between full employment and price stability, policy
makers had to temper their desire to support employment training
programs that were funded through deficit spending-- such as the
relief efforts adopted during the Depression-- with the knowledge
of how these programs might cause inflated prices.
The Shift to "Maximum Employment" Policies
In 1946, the Employment Act was passed. The intent of the Act
was to give the federal government even more responsibility for
"maintaining a high and stable level of employment" than they had
with employment training programs implemented to date (Employment
Act of 1946). More specifically, the Act declared that
"government should promote maximum employment and employment
opportunities using all practicable means" (Franklin, 5). It is
important to note that this mandate represented a shift in the
goal of achieving "full employment" to "maximum employment".
With passage of the Employment Act, federal policy makers made a
subtle shift in their intention with regard to the national
unemployment problem-- the federal government intended to make a
good faith effort at maintaining acceptably low levels of
unemployment.
Support for this legislation was evident two years earlier
in the 1944 Presidential campaign when "both political parties
made gestures toward the goal of high and stable employment"
(Gordon, 48). Support for the Employment Act also came from post
World War II anxieties that there would be wide-spread
unemployment among soldiers and other personnel returning from
the war (Clague and Kramer, 6). Fortunately, widespread
unemployment among veterans did not occur, and consequently,
there was no recessionary impact on the national economy (Ibid.).
Instead, "an inflationary business expansion in 1947-48 which
abolished civilian unemployment that occurred due to lay offs
10
caused by the sharp decline in war industries", but this was
followed by "a minor post war recession in ... 1948-49" (Ibid.).
Because the provisions of the Act were not mandatory, and because
foreign policy issues emerged, such as Soviet advances in space
travel and nuclear technology, the federal government's focus
shifted away from domestic issues. Ultimately, the Employment
Act did not stimulate much federal activity with regard to the
development of employment training policies and programs.
Renewed interest in these activities did not surface again until
the 1960s (Franklin, 5).
Immediate concern did mount, however, with regard to how
national unemployment levels were related to increased automation
in manufacturing. Norbert Wiener, a professor at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, predicted in his book
Cybernetics (1947), that
the effect of the new technology advances which had come as
a byproduct of the war ... would displace labor at an
unprecedented rate, and that in 20 years-- by about 1967--
the nation could expect the unemployment of many millions of
superfluous unskilled workers (Claugue and Kramer, 7).
Initially, Professor Weiner's projections about the impact of
automation on the labor market were overshadowed by foreign
policy matters. His projections were taken even less seriously
because of the post Korean War business recovery of 1955-56, when
relatively high levels of employment were being maintained
(Ibid.). However, the impact of automation on the labor market
was taken more seriously in the late 1950s, when economic growth
slowed and computer technology expanded.
Structural Unemployment: Manpower Programs
By 1960, when the Kennedy administration took office,
unemployment had risen so dramatically that federal policy makers
decided that policies should focus on the need to stimulate the
economy and create jobs. At this time 8.1 million Americans were
unemployed, the greatest number unemployed since before the World
War II (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 301). One of the first
employment training initiatives implemented was the Area
Redevelopment Act (ARA - 1961). The intention of the ARA was to
"stimulate economic growth at specific locations around the
country that were [economically depressed and] experiencing high
unemployment". Methods by which economic growth was to be
stimulated included the following:
1. providing loans to companies that were interested in
the relocating or expanding industrial facilities in
economically depressed areas;
2. providing financial aid to local jurisdictions to make
public improvements that were required for the
establishment of manufacturing and commercial firms in
the area;
3. providing technical assistance to firms in the
development of new products, new markets, and new
resources; and
4. assuring that a qualified, skilled labor force would be
available to those businesses which were willing to
accept the risks of plant expansion or relocation
(Clague and Kramer, 11).
The rational behind these business incentives was that "in
order to approach full employment, the economy had to be
stimulated, and the functioning of the labor market and the
quality and adaptability of the labor force had to be improved"
(Manpower Report to the President 1963, xii). The rational
continues, "with an expanded economy, demand for labor will
increase, and provide additional job opportunities" (Ibid.).
Since the nation's aggregate unemployment rate was being
disaggregated according to race, gender, region of the country,
etc., by this time, policy makers could see to what extent
employment training programs benefitted particular segments of
the workforce at various locations. Ultimately, the business
incentives built into ARA programs had little impact on changing
actual business practices, and therefore unemployment. The
potential impact of the business incentives was not fully
realized because ARA funds were distributed broadly throughout
the country. Funds were not concentrated in those locations with
the greatest need for economic development assistance. Lack of
political will at the federal level to establish distribution
priorities is at least part of the reason why the ARA had limited
impact on unemployment in economically depressed locations and
among segments of the workforce-- women, people of color, youth--
of unemployment rates were was high, relative to the aggregate
unemployment rate (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 310).
Next, the federal government created the Manpower
Development and Training Act (MDTA - 1962). The MDTA was similar
to the ARA in that it emphasized the creation of programs to
"retrain the unemployed into a ready-made labor force, which, it
was hoped, would attract new employers to depressed areas", and
ultimately, stimulate economic growth (Ibid., 303). The
difference between the ARA and MDTA was that the latter program
was national in scope, not restricted to depressed areas (Ibid.).
Preference for acceptance into MDTA programs was given to
"mature, experienced family heads who had been displaced by [the
type of] technological changes" that Wiener had predicted in 1947
(Ibid.). As a result, training program administrators selected
more qualified individuals for placement in these programs
because they were more familiar with the world of work, and
therefore, had a better chance of completing program requirements
than individuals with a lower skill level and less familiarity
with the world of work. The implication of this bias toward
better qualified workers was that segments of the workforce who
started out with little or no skills-- typically women, youth and
people of color-- were under-represented in MDTA programs. This
realization posed a dilemma for federal policy makers, and they
responded by establishing a rule which reserved one third of all
training positions in MDTA programs for the least qualified
applicants to the program (Clague, 14). Making this commitment
to the least qualified members of the workforce required that
federal policy makers develop partnerships with local private
sector employers, whereby employers received federal subsidies in
exchange for hiring a certain percentage of less qualified
workers for positions that, but for this government intervention,
would have been offered to better qualified individuals (Levitan,
Mangum and Marshall, 303).
The MDTA differed from the ARA in other important ways. The
MDTA provided trainees with training and living allowances.
Allowances were provided because federal policy makers finally
realized that helping the truly disadvantaged improve their
skills and qualifications for employment in an increasingly
mechanized labor market, meant much more than providing
retraining programs alone; the truly disadvantaged also needed
various types of support and subsidizes in order to fully benefit
from the opportunities and resources provided in training
programs developed under this Act. The ARA and the MDTA were the
first of many "manpower" programs developed in the 1960s. The
purpose of manpower programs was to "bring about a better
adjustment of supply to demand in the different points of the
labor market, and more generally, to improve the functioning of
the labor market" (Gordon, 178).
By the time Johnson assumed the presidency in 1963, federal
policy makers fully acknowledged that "unemployment and poverty
were concentrated within [certain] segments of the population for
reasons not necessarily directly connected to the [normal
operation of the] labor market" (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall,
308). In response, the emphasis of federally-sponsored
employment training programs shifted to address the "structural"
barriers to employment. Federal policy makers recognized that
"structural" barriers, such as racial discrimination or lack of
knowledge about employment opportunities and where they are
located, precluded particular segments of the workforce from
certain jobs. According to Robert Gordon, author of The Goal of
Full Employment, the condition of being "structurally unemployed"
occurs when the following two essential conditions prevail in one
or more sectors of the national labor market (Gordon, 57):
1. there must be come degree of labor immobility along one
or more dimensions of the labor force. Thus, even when
there is no deficiency of aggregate demand, there will
be particular sectors of the labor force from which
workers cannot easily and quickly move to other sectors
in search of jobs. The reasons for such immobility may
be many-- lack of education or training, attachment to
a community or region, lack of information as to where
jobs are available, restriction on entry into an
occupation, restrictive hiring practices including
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or religion,
and so on.
2. in some or all of these sectors with impaired mobility,
unemployment significantly exceeds available vacancies
even when there is no deficiency of aggregate demand.
Supply exceeds demand, at prevailing wage rates, in
some sectors of the labor market, and market forces are
not strong enough to eliminate these imbalances where
they exist. Hence unemployment rates are higher in
these sectors than in the economy as a whole, and such
differentially high unemployment rates tend to persist
for relatively long periods (Ibid.).
By the end of the 1960s, a complex web of manpower programs
existed that were intended to "assist ... different target
group[s]; each [program] also specified different objectives,
[and] had different approaches for solving problems" (Clague and
Kramer, 31). These problems lead to several critiques of the
federal government's efforts. Critics labeled the federal
government's effort as "piecemeal" and "scattered", with several
different departments and agencies [involved], with each
agency involved in the distribution of manpower services
drawing its authority from a different legislative act, and
each act imposing its own conditions on the utilization of
funds (Ibid.).
Managing all of the different manpower programs from Washington
became increasingly inefficient and ineffective, and for this
reason, management practices were re-evaluated and redesigned to
better coordinate activities among different programs at the
federal and the local levels.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) brought
about changes in the way the programs developed under the MDTA
would be managed, in the following ways
CETA combined many of the categorical programs [developed in
the 1960s] into a single block grant and transferred
responsibility for their administration from the federal to
the state and local governments. These local units were to
provide employment, training, and remedial services
primarily for the structurally unemployed-- those who,
because of inadequate education, lack of skills, or other
structural impediments, [were] at a disadvantage in the
labor market (New CETA: Effect on Public Service Employment
Programs 1980, 1-2).
The need to coordinate and streamline federal employment and
training efforts so that they were better managed at all levels,
was evident by the 1970s, but the intermediary steps which needed
to be taken to bring about the changes were very difficult to
implement. Problems in implementation arose because local
agencies, who were charged with new and different administrative
responsibilities under CETA, "resisted giving up what they
perceived to be their power [or "turf"], even after agreements
had been arduously negotiated at the national level" (Franklin
and Ripley, 7). In addition, problems arose around program
content due to "significant divergence in the national and local
program goals" (New CETA: Effect on Public Service Employment
Programs, 12). It is important to note that the underlying
assumption of creating a program with a decentralized management
style, such as CETA, is that national and local goals are closely
matched. Unfortunately, the goals did not match, and the
inability of local and federal officials to agree on one set of
goals lead to "charges of fraud and abuse, waste and
mismanagement" within federal and local levels of government as
the changes in management practices and program content were
implemented (Ibid.).
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) replaced CETA in
1982 as the vehicle through which the federal government would
participate in local employment training programs. The JTPA was
passed under the rubric of "New Federalism", President Reagan's
political philosophy which "assigns to states and localities,
rather than to the federal government, the responsibility for
administering federally-funded programs, include job training"
programs (The Job Training Partnership Act 1987, 1). In this
sense, the JTPA is similar to CETA. On the other hand, New
Federalism represented a fundamental change in the approach that
previous federal administrations had adopted with regard to how
to address issues of social welfare. Prior to the adoption of
JTPA, federal policy makers favored either 'people-oriented'
policies designed to attract economic activity back to urban
areas (jobs to people [the ARA])", or policies that were 'place-
oriented [New Careers])' and "encourage[ed] labor mobility
(people to jobs)" (Wolman, 303). The Reagan administration chose
an approach that involved considerably less political
intervention into the free working of the labor market on behalf
of the structurally unemployed. This approach
posits that the problems of urban areas and their residents
will be solved through the operations of normal market
mechanisms. It assumes that both labor and capital are
highly mobile. Unemployed labor in large urban areas will
migrate to areas of job availability. At the same time,
unemployed resources will drive down factor prices in
distressed urban economies relative to other areas, thus
increasing the return on capital and providing the incentive
for additional capital investment and job creation (Ibid.,
314).
The assumption that "both labor and capital are highly
mobile" renders the Reagan administration's market approach
considerably less effective than programs developed prior to this
time, at helping to achieve full or maximum employment of the
workforce because the assumption ignores the impact of
"structural and institutional barriers" to gainful employment
which Gordon discussed in his book published 15 years earlier.
The same structural barriers that constrained labor mobility in
the 1960s and before-- lack of education or training and lack of
information as to where jobs are available-- still existed when
the JTPA was adopted. For the Reagan administration to create
economic development policies and programs that ignore the
reality that "market forces are not strong enough to eliminate
the imbalances that cause structural unemployment", shows limited
understanding of this debilitating condition, and little
commitment to the goal of full or maximum employment for those
segments of the population with the highest levels of
unemployment.
The aspect of the JTPA which best exemplifies preference for
a market-driven approach to addressing the problem of
unemployment is the mandatory participation of Private Industry
Councils (PIC) in the operation of local training programs. The
PICs are intended to work in conjunction with local and State
elected officials to "provide policy guidance and oversight of
local job training plans" (The Job Training Partnership Act, 39).
Federal policy makers believed that the participation of PICs was
crucial because
local business representatives not only understand better
than public officials what kinds of job training are most
likely to be required in their own communities, but ... they
will also bring to the program a concern for efficiency and
performance that was often lacking in earlier [federally-
sponsored job training] programs ... , which resulted in the
unfortunate instances of misfeasance and malfeasance that
undermined public confidence in the role of the Federal
Government in providing employment and training to the poor
and unemployed (Ibid., 2).
Like many of its predecessors, the JTPA, especially with
it's sharp break from tradition about how the federal government
should participate in employment training programs, has not
proven to be more effective at preparing the unemployed for
available jobs, reducing unemployment or maintaining acceptably
low levels of unemployment, even with the participation of the
PICs. More generally, sixty years after the federal government's
initial commitment to full employment, and the subsequent
adjustment in the economic policy goals to maximizing employment
opportunities for all willing and able to work with the
Employment Act of 1946, together with all of the manpower
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programs created in the 1960s, federal policy makers have not
found the best way to design and administer employment training
programs and balance the policy goals of full employment and
price stability.
The Situation in Boston
The shift in the federal government's philosophy about how they
would participate in local employment training initiatives has a
negative financial impact on the city of Boston. Their shift in
philosophy resulted in a sharp decline in financial support for
these activities. In 1980, federal funding for job training in
Boston totaled $65 million; in 1986, federal funding had been
reduced to $5.5 million--, a 92% reduction! City officials
responded by looking for ways to lesson the impact of the 92% cut
on neighborhood-based training organizations. one suggestion
offered was to centralize all training activities at one downtown
location. Neighborhood training organizations asserted that
residents would not travel beyond their immediate neighborhoods
for employment training and related services, and lobbied the
Mayor against accepting this proposal. They were successful at
convincing him that maintaining neighborhood-based training
centers was in the best interest of the city. Once this was
decided, city officials concluded that the most important thing
they could do in the face of drastic budget cuts was "shore-up
and financially stabilize" the training organizations so they
could remain in business. Consequently, the Mayor's desire to
financially stabilize the neighborhood training organizations
became an implicit jobs linkage program goal. The explicit goal
remained "to direct the benefits of downtown growth to Boston's
neighborhoods" ("Building Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE:
Affordable Homes and Jobs" 1988, 1).
Due to the federal funding cuts, priorities had to be
established about how to spend the limited money Boston would
have for employment training activities, especially since
unemployment rates of youth and minorities in particular, were
above the average unemployment rate for the city as a whole
(Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment 1986, Table
23). In 1986, Boston's aggregate unemployment rate in Boston
was 3.4%. For youth, ages 16-19, the unemployment rate was 7.7%,
for blacks, 5.5%, and for hispanics, 8.1% (Ibid.). The rate for
women, 3.3%, was slightly lower than the aggregate rate of 3.4%
(Ibid.).
Also at this time, many of Boston's employment training
professionals, whose programs depended on continued federal
support, were indicating that the environment within which they
were operating their programs was in a state of "crisis". The
Job Training Alliance, an organization comprised of many of
Boston's job training and ancillary service providers, described
this crisis in terms of the inability of training providers such
as themselves, to provide clients, the structurally unemployed,
with adequate training services on a continuing basis. They
described the crisis in the following specific terms:
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-The problems and issues that individuals are bringing with
them to training programs have increased. They include:
homelessness, drug and alcohol dependency, abuse, health,
day care, as well as language, basic skills and other
issues. The performance system and the program resources
made available [to us] do not assist [our] programs in
dealing with these issues. These issues clearly affect
program performance.
-The decline in funding, the short term commitments, the
growing administrative complexity and the performance
contracting system, coupled with reduced infra-structure
support, have created an administrative and financial
"gridlock" for program operators. We knew that
organizations were going to go out of business. In the last
year, at least two groups have not bid on contracts; four
organizations and programs have closed and others are now at
risk of closing. Other community based organizations may be
forced to not participate in employment and training
programs.
-The population being served by employment and training
programs represents only a small fraction of those in need
of training and education. The working poor, ... and low
income men are not being served. Many of the working poor
have fallen back on welfare. Employment and training
programs have not assisted with the formation of functioning
economically viable households (The Job Training Alliance,
1).
By the time the federal budget cuts had declined 92%, the
city's employment training professionals began to speak-out and
ask for assistance in providing better quality services.
The inability of Boston's employment training professionals
to adequately prepare multi-problem clients for available
positions was also acknowledged by area employers. According to
a survey of 250 of New England's largest employers conducted by
the National Alliance of Business, 71% of the survey respondents
rated community agencies and the JTPA programs only fair or poor
at filling complany needs" (Overview 1990, 1). While this was a
regional survey, the 71% rate of dissatisfaction with JTPA
programs is probably somewhat representative of the sentiments of
some of Boston's employers. In response to this system-wide
crisis and the private sector's rating of JTPA programs, public
officials tried to identify ways to improve upon the federal
government's record of preparing residents to meet local labor
force needs.
Also by mid-decade, Boston's real estate development market
was experiencing tremendous growth:
from 1975 - 1988, private development investment added 17
million square feet of new office space and over 82,000 new
office jobs to Boston. This amount of space [was] three
times the amount built in the previous 35 years ("Building
Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE: Affordable Homes and Jobs",
5).
Despite the fact that the real estate development industry was
booming and many new jobs were being created as a result, a 1986
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) report indicated that
"Boston residents [had] not captured a fair share of the higher
skilled and higher paying jobs" that were coming to the city as a
result of the development boom (Kayden, Case, Pollard 1986, 3).
The BRA report also indicated that,
less than a quarter of new jobs created by downtown office
development are held by Boston residents" , ... and that "of
those jobs held by Boston residents, they are lower-skilled
and lower-paying than those held by non-residents (Ibid.).
The report concluded by stating that "with proper training,
Boston residents would be able to secure a higher percentage of
entry-level office jobs that they currently enjoy" (Ibid., 4).
This particular condition was the impetus for creating a job
training linkage program.
Boston Adopts a New Approach
When the limits of the federal government's support for local
employment training efforts became apparent, and the city's
employment training professionals indicated that their ability to
provide adequate services had diminished, public officials looked
to the linkage mechanism as a way to secure additional funding
for these activities. Consideration of the linkage mechanism was
not an attempt to replace the millions of dollars in federal
funding that the city had lost. However, the linkage mechanism
did emerge as supplemental funding from local sources that could
be used for employment training activities. The linkage
mechanism was attractive to public officials for other reasons as
well. Part of the attraction came as a result of laws, such as
Proposition 2 1/2, which limited government's ability to generate
tax revenue for social welfare and other important programs.
Ultimately, however, it was the combination of the desire to
supplement funding for employment training programs, and a strong
commercial development market which made linkage an attractive
option.
The Creation of the Linkage Ordinance
The concept of linkage was first introduced to Boston in 1982 by
a coalition of citizens' groups and public officials (including
then City Councilor Raymond L. Flynn) with support from the
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Boston Globe ("Building Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE:
Affordable Homes and Jobs", 12). In March 1983, a housing
linkage program was passed by Boston's City council, but it was
vetoed by then Mayor Kevin White (Ibid.). In June of that year,
Mayor White announced the formation of a thirty member Advisory
Group to refine this new concept of having major developers
contribute to a fund dedicated to expanding the supply of decent
and affordable housing for local residents (The Linkage Between
Downtown Development and Neighborhood Housing 1983, 1). The
Advisory Group was comprised of developers, financiers,
representatives from neighborhood-based non-profit organizations,
housing advocates, academicians, and representatives from City
government (Ibid.). In their final report, the Advisory Group
recommended the establishment of the city's first linkage program
for affordable housing. Raymond L. Flynn was elected Mayor in
November 1983, and in December, "the Boston Zoning Commission
established Article 26 under the Boston Zoning Code for the
creation of low- and moderate-income housing" (Boston
Redevelopment Authority 1986, 1). Article 26 required
developers to pay $5 per square foot, over the first 100,000
square feet, for new, enlarged or expanded, and/or substantially
rehabilitated projects, into a trust fund for the creation of
affordable housing (Ibid.). The ordinance further specified that
"payments [will be] made in equal installments over twelve years,
beginning two years after the issuance of building permits, or
upon issuance of the certificate of occupancy, which ever [comes]
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first" (Ibid.).
Three years later, Mayor Flynn proposed two amendments to
Article 26. The first amendment, Article 26A, reduced the
linkage fee payback period from twelve to seven years, and
required that payments begin at the issuance of a building permit
instead of two years after issuance of the building permit, or
upon issuance of the certificate of occupancy (Ibid.). The
reduction of the payback period resulted in significant financial
benefits for the city because the net present value of the
linkage payment was doubled (Ibid.). City officials felt that
such a reduction in the payback period was warranted given the
severity of the shortage of affordable housing at this time. The
actual per square footage fee for housing linkage remained at
$5.00.
Article 26B proposed an additional $1 linkage fee and with
it, the creation of the first jobs training linkage program in
the country (Ibid., 2). Like housing linkage fees, the job
training linkage fee applied to the construction of new, enlarged
or expanded, and/or substantially rehabilitated projects over
100,000 gross square feet located in downtown Boston (Ibid.).
Funds generated by Article 26B were to be used to fund innovative
job training programs that would prepare residents for jobs
coming to the city in great numbers as a result of the
development boom. Under both the housing and jobs linkage
programs, "any building or structure which is, or will be,
wholly-owned by one or more public agencies, is not subject to
linkage requirements" (Boston Zoning Code, Article 26B, 4).
The Neighborhood Jobs Trust (NJT), a city of Boston
charitable trust created in 1987, administers the jobs linkage
program. The NJT was created to ensure that "large scale
development activity brings a direct benefit to Boston
neighborhood residents in the form of jobs, job training and
related services" ("A Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 1).
The NJT is managed by three Trustees: a member of the City
Council, and appointee of the Mayor, and the Collector-Treasurer
of the City of Boston who -serves as the managing Trustee (Ibid.,
2).
Administrative support for the NJT is provided by the
Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services (JCS) on a day-to-
day basis. JCS was established by Mayor Flynn in 1985 for the
purpose of increasing "access to education, support services and
job training for city residents" ("FY89 Annual Report (Draft
Version" 1989, 4). As a city agency, JCS operates an
"integrated system of neighborhood-based education, job training,
job placement, and support [programs] for Boston residents, in
cooperation with communit[ies], other public agencies, and
private business" (Ibid.). In total, JCS manages approximately
130 programs annually, which provide services to more than 50,000
city residents. Roughly 50% of these programs were supported by
JTPA funds in 1989. The remainder of JCS operating budget comes
form state and city sources.
In programs supported by both JTPA and linkage funds,
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neighborhood training organizations enter into contracts with JCS
to perform services for the number of students specified in the
contract. JTPA funding guidelines dictate that organizations
receive 50% of the total contract amount when students are
enrolled; the balance is released when training is complete in
the following manner: the balance is released in an amount equal
to the cost for the number of students that have completed the
training program which have been placed in a job, and have
remained on that same job for a minimum of 30 days. In other
words, the balance of the payment is reduced by the per student
training cost, multiplied by the number of students that did not
complete training, and/or completed training but did not remain
on the job for at least 30 days. Even in a case where an
individual that has completed training and has been placed in a
job dies unexpectedly after her 28th day at work for example,
according to JTPA guidelines, JCS cannot reimburse the
neighborhood training organization for any of the training
services provided. Due to these restrictive funding procedures,
employment training professionals characterize JTPA funding
procedures as "fiscally traumatic", because they cause severe
cash flow problems and require that they operate a program from
start to finish, with only half of the funds required. JCS staff
have stated that it is not unusual for neighborhood training
organizations to have a line of credit with a local bank in order
to meet their financial responsibilities.
By contrast, money granted under the jobs linkage program
can be "forward funded" on an as needed basis-- the total funding
award for training and related services for linkage programs can
be released by JCS in advance of the start of a program. This
more flexible funding procedure reduces the severity of cash flow
problems that are prevalent under JTPA contracts. JCS adjusts
any over-expenditures made with the forward funding procedure
when programs are evaluated for performance near the end of the
contract period. Also, during public hearings to advertise the
availability of jobs linkage funds and consultations with
individual training organizations, JCS indicates that linkage
funding will be granted for two years only, and a second year of
funding will be granted only if performance criteria are met in
the first year. If selected, grantees must identify potential
funding sources from which they plan to secure funding when jobs
linkage money is no longer available.
Under Article 26B developers can exercise one of two options
in order to fulfill the job training linkage program
requirements. The first option is the "Jobs Creation Grant".
Under this option, the developer must work with (a) neighborhood
training organization(s) to develop a program proposal, with the
expectation that graduates will be employed by the developer's
tenants ("Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 3). The second
option, the "Jobs Contribution Grant", is simply a fee paid
directly to the NJT which becomes part of a larger pool of funds
that are distributed on a competitive bid basis. Under the jobs
contribution grant option, JCS reserves 20% of each linkage
payment for distribution to organizations "in the neighborhood or
neighborhoods where or adjacent to where the development project
is located" (Boston Zoning Code, Article 26B, 2). Under both
options, payments are made in two equal installments. The first
installment is due upon the issuance of a building permit, and
the balance of the payment is due and payable on the anniversary
of the first payment (Ibid.). The dollar amount of the jobs
linkage fee is identical under both options.
Neighborhood organizations can participate in the jobs
linkage program by- pursuing funds in two ways. First,
organizations can compete in an open and competitive RFP process
for funds collected under the jobs contribution grant option.
The second way neighborhood organizations can participate is at
the invitation of a developer that selects the jobs creation
option. A developer selects (a) particular training
organization(s) to work with in designing a training program.
Selection is based on the type of services the organization
provides and how well they otherwise complement the type of
program the developer wishes to create.
JTPA programs are judged according to three sets of
performance standards which apply differently to youth, adults,
and welfare recipients. The standards are as follows: the post-
training placement rate, the average wage rate at placement, and
the termination or attrition rate (The Job Training Partnership
Agt, 71,72). JTPA performance standards are grounded in a
competitive, market-based philosophy which asserts that "program
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funds must be treated as investment in human capital from which a
profit shall be realized and not as expenditures that yield no
measurable return to the Nation" (Ibid., 2).
In their decision to grant funds to neighborhood
organizations competing for funds collected under the jobs
contribution grant option, and in their attempt to guide
developers in the selection of training organizations under the
jobs creation option. JCS uses the following general performance
criteria to determine if an organization is eligible for a grant:
demonstrated need, effectiveness of approach and cost
effectiveness, successful enrollment, retention and
placement as defined in the approved proposal, and
[compliance] with any other criteria established by the
Trustees ("Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 3).
JCS and the NJT also stress the need for neighborhood
organizations working collaboratively, as well as the importance
of creating new and innovative programs which differ from those
already supported by federal JTPA funds. These are important
considerations because JCS realizes that not all of the city's
training organizations can possibly be "shored-up", and survive
over the long term with grants from the job training linkage
program alone. Linkage funds are also flexible enough to be used
to research pressing labor market issues.
In light of the current state of Boston's employment
training system and the severe decline in federal support for
employment training activities, it will be worthwhile to consider
whether the job training linkage program is a new model for the
delivery of employment training activities in Boston. Such an
inquiry is also important given the fact that JCS is in the
process of assessing the city's entire employment training
system. JCS is conducting this assessment in an effort to
identify techniques and individual programs that can be
replicated on a larger scale and help "close the gap between
"workers' skill level and workplace requirements" in the city
(Overview, 8). I will analyze the results of two of the first
programs funded by jobs linkage money in an effort to determine
to what degree this program can help the city achieve its goals.
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CHAPTER TWO: SHORT-TERM OUTCOMES: THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST YEAR
OF BOSTON'S JOB TRAINING LINKAGE PROGRAM
In November 1988, the first group of neighborhood training
organizations was selected to receive grants under Boston's job
training linkage program to fund new employment training
programs. With the selection of the first grant recipients,
public officials hoped that these organizations would create
programs whose short-term impact would be to improve upon the
ability of JTPA-sponsored programs to prepare city residents for
positions with the city's employers, and in the long-run, help
reduce structural unemployment.
This Chapter will discuss the results of the first year the
job training linkage program operated. All information cited in
this Chapter was collected in the following manner: 13
interviews were conducted with individuals who were involved in
the development of the zoning text amendment, Article 26, which
created Boston's job training linkage program. I also
interviewed individuals who either currently manage the program,
or work for organizations that had to fulfill the jobs linkage
requirement. Most interviews were followed-up by a telephone
conversation during which I confirmed information obtained during
the interview, or asked additional questions (A list of
individuals interviewed appears on page 95). All figures and
dollar amounts cited in this and all other Chapters were taken
from documents cited in the Bibliography, page 96, of which all
are public documents. I have chosen not to identify
organizations or individuals interviewed within the text of this
document so that the reader would focus on the issues at hand and
not the personalities involved.
Since the job training linkage program took effect in 1986,
a total of $2,527,268.89 has been collected by the NJT from
sixteen different development projects ("Total Linkage Funds
Collected through March 31, 1990" 1990, 1). Total dollars
granted by the NJT in 1989, the first funding cycle, was
$1,274,243 ("1989 Programs" 1989, 1). According to Bill Lee
from the office of the Collector Treasurer for the City of
Boston, any amount of money that the trustees do not award in a
given funding cycle is "turned over and used in the following
year". Eleven organizations received grants totaling $1,074,243
to train approximately 900 individuals (Ibid.). An additional
$185,000 was granted to an organization for training purposes as
well, but that organization was not able to determine how many
people its program would serve by the time the same information
was released about the remaining eleven organizations (Ibid.).
Another grant in the amount for $15,000 was made to an
organization that studied an important labor market issue
(Ibid.).
Program Descriptions
The following is a list of the thirteen organizations selected, a
brief description of each program, and the grant amount each
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organization received:
1. CHINATOWN SERVICES CONSORTIUM
This collaborative program among the Quincy School Community
Council, Chinese American Civic Association and the
Chinatown Occupational Training Center serves 160 individual
in three program components: English as a Second Language,
Prevocational Training, and Business Education.
$232,000
2. HISPANIC TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Oficina Hispana, Sociedad Latina, Wentworth Institute and
UNICCO Service Corporation have collaborated to provide
building maintenance skills training and work experience to
50 unemployed or underemployed Hispanic adults.
$160,000
3. VETERANS BENEFITS CLEARINGHOUSE
VBC is working in partnership with Roxbury Medical Labs to
train 24 individuals as phlebotomist and laboratory
assistants.
$47,000
4. JEWISH VOCATIONAL SERVICES
JVS and the Boston Harbor Hotel are providing on-site work
place education services for 60 limited English speaking
hotel employees.
$20,000
5. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF BOSTON
International Institute provides worksite English as a
Second Language instruction and work readiness skills to 30
limited English speaking trainees at Inner City in order to
increase their access to permanent employment opportunities.
$35,000
6. JACKSON/MANN COMMUNITY SCHOOL
The Next-Step Program provides vocationally-oriented
advanced English as a Second Language, math, writing and
science instruction to 60 individuals in preparation for
training, permanent employment and/or higher education.
$45,000
7. HISTORIC NEIGHBORHOOD FOUNDATION
Historic Neighborhoods has created a pilot program in Urban
Design and Construction to introduce 40 students at English
High and Boston Tech to career opportunities in planning,
design, development and construction fields.
$15,000
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8. PARENTS UNITED FOR CHILDCARE
Parents United for Childcare has been given this award to
complete a survey of parents which assessed their needs for
and access to school-age child care.
$15,000
9. BOSTON JOBS ACADEMY
The Boston Jobs Academy offers job readiness, job seeking
and job retention services to 370 unemployed or
underemployed Boston residents.
$250,000
10. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL
This program provides on-the-job training in health care
occupations and classroom support for 40 at-risk students at
English High School.
$25,593
11. BOSTON TECHNICAL CENTER
Skills training in the Printing and Business Machine Repair
occupations are provided for 36 individuals.
$65,000
12. CONFERENCE OF BOSTON TEACHING HOSPITALS
Working with community-based training providers, COBTH will
upgrade the occupational skills of current employees and
provide entry-level training and educational services to
unemployed residents to improve their employment
opportunities at area hospitals.
$185,000
13. NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE/TRAINING, INC.
This partnership provides remediation, clerical skills and
test-taking skills for 56 individuals who have been
unsuccessful in their application to NET for employment.
The program prepares students to succeed in a second
application process and on the job. Graduates are
guaranteed employment at NET upon completion
$179,650 ("1989 Programs" 1989 1,2).
With the exception of the programs developed by the Boston
Technical Center, the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals and
New England Telephone/Training Inc., grants made to each of these
organizations were approved in November 1988 for calendar year
1989. Funding for these three organizations was also approved in
November 1988, but their programs ran longer than the 1989
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calendar year.
Program Performances
The performance of the first programs funded with jobs linkage
money was mixed, but overall it was positive. Out of a total of
eleven organizations, more than half were able to provide
training services to 100% or more of the number of people they
were under contract to provide services to (end note). Referring
to Table 2.1 (next page), "Contract Estimate" is the number of
people each organization originally estimated they would recruit
and provide services to when they received the grant from the
NJT. The "Actual Number" represents the actual number of people
that were recruited and received training. There was no
"Contract Estimate" for the Conference of Boston Teaching
Hospital program, therefore, it has not been included in the
"Actual Number Served" since their actual performance could not
be compared an original estimate. It is important to indicate
that the "Actual Number" is not the number of people who were
placed in jobs. Information on placement of linkage program
trainees was not available. Nonetheless, the count of the actual
number served is important because it is an indication of the
number of people whose skills were upgraded, or in some way
enhanced as a result of the jobs linkage program. Enhancing the
skills of the structurally unemployed is an important first step
in the larger effort of reducing unemployment on a city-wide
basis. The long-term implication of not accounting for this step
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is that an inequitable distribution of jobs would persist among
segments of Boston's workforce. For this reason, developing
programs aimed at enhancing the skills of the structurally
unemployed is worthwhile.
The performances of the first group of programs funded with
jobs linkage money are very important because they will indicate
how close the selected training organizations came to creating
the type of programs that would attract the structurally
unemployed. The performance of the first programs funded with
jobs linkage money are as follows:
TABLE 2.1 Jobs Linkage Program Results
PROGRAM CONTRACT ACTUAL NO. PERCENTAGE
ESTIMATE SERVED
1. Ch. Serv. Consort. 160 160 100%
2. Hisp. Tech. Corp. 50 28 56%
3. Veteran's Clear. 24 27 100%
4. Jewish Voc. Servs. 60 38 63%
5. International Inst. 30 53 100%
6. Jackson/Mann 60 60 100%
7. Hist. Neighb. Found. 40 40 100%
8. Jobs Academy 370 196 53%
9. Children's Hosp. 40 40 100%
10. Boston Tech. Ctr. 36 15 42%
11. Conf. Teach Hosp. -- 80 ---
12. NETCo./Train., Inc. 56 15 27%
TOTAL 926 672
("Clients Served in 1989" 1990, 1)
In order to positively impact the structurally unemployed,
the jobs linkage programs, like any other employment training
effort targeted to the same population, should possess certain
characteristics and certain other conditions should be present
which are known to be effective in addressing the concerns of
this particular segment of the workforce. Several examples of
federally-sponsored training efforts have given Boston's
employment training professionals evidence of what some of the
more important characteristics are.
In order to determine how many of the programs supported by
linkage dollars had these characteristics, and were therefore, in
a good position to improve the qualifications of the city's
structurally unemployed residents, one would want to analyze the
performance of each program. Approaching the analysis of the
jobs linkage effort in its first year in such a comprehensive
manner is preferable if one is attempting to identify with some
degree of certainty, the presence of these characteristics and
the impact their contribution made on program performance.
Unfortunately, information on the characteristics of each program
was not available for the purpose of this study. As a result, I
chose to analyze two programs for which almost complete
information was available, to determine to what degree these
characteristics and conditions were present, and how they may or
may not have effected overall program performance. One program
performed very well, the collaboration between Children's
Hospital and English High School. Together, the hospital and the
school were able to provide services to 100% of the number of
students they were under contract to serve. The other program,
the collaboration between New England Telephone Company (NETCo)
and Training, Inc., did not perform as well. NETCo and Training,
Inc were able to provided services to only 27% of the people they
estimated they would be able to serve. The following is a
description of each program:
A. Children's Hospital/English High School
The collaboration between Children's Hospital and English High
School in the design of a job training linkage program is one
that has been singled out as having exceeded the expectations of
public officials and program administrators. In 1988, Children's
Hospital paid a linkage fee in the amount of $42,800 in
conjunction with an expansion project at their Longwood Medical
Center site ("Total Jobs Linkage Contributions Through March 31,
1990" 1990 1). A portion of their linkage fee supported this
job creation program. This program was designed "for students
who are at risk of dropping out of school and who are unmotivated
by the traditional educational environment" (Children's Today
1989, 10). More specifically, the goals of the program were to
increase career awareness; develop appropriate work
behaviors; provide employment opportunities that have
potential for career growth; help employers meet a labor
market need in certain health care positions; and provide a
positive educational and work experience for at-risk
students, leading to a higher number of such students
completing their education (Ibid., 2).
Students have benefitted from this program so much that it has
become one of the offerings of the "Fenway Program", a series of
alternative educational programs within the Boston public school
system which take place in supportive settings and which cater to
the particular needs of at-risk students. Students who are at-
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risk of dropping out of school are encouraged to select one
offering from the Fenway Program and enroll with the intention of
completing their high school education within the guidelines of
that program.
B. NETCo/Training, Inc.
Unlike Children's Hospital, NETCo did not pay a linkage fee.
NETCo competed for linkage money in an RFP process that JCS
manages to distribute money from the pool of funds collected
through the jobs contribution grant option.
The purpose of this collaboration was to help NETCo address
a long-standing hiring problem. The problem consisted of the
following: several people were applying for entry level clerical
positions, but many did not meet the company's basic standards
for hiring. NETCo believed that having the assistance of a
training organization, independent of their professional staff,
would be helpful in identifying better qualified applicants that
could meet their basic hiring standards. NETCo's basic hiring
standard is a standardized test which is administered to all
applicants for entry level clerical positions. Most applicants
failed the test. Therefore, the purpose of the linkage program
was to upgrade the skills of people who had taken NETCo's
standardized test and failed it. Given the low level of success
NETCo had in identifying qualified individuals prior to the
linkage effort, it is curious that in their jobs linkage program
proposal, the company indicated that they were "confident that
[their] employment process [which begins and often ends with a
standardized test] identifies those applicants who have the best
potential for successful employment" ("New England Telephone
Second Chance Program" 1989, 5).
This additional information about the two organizations was
included to provide a basis for a comparison of a set of-
characteristics that jobs linkage programs should possess if they
are going to have the capacity to positively impact structurally
unemployed residents in Boston.
Program Characteristics and Conditions
Over the years, it has become apparent that individuals who are
suspended in the condition of being structurally unemployed need
much more than simply education or skills training to improve
their standard of living and that of their dependents. Recent
evidence of the truth of this statement are the declarations of
Boston's employment training professionals, who have indicated
that they do not currently have the capacity to service the
multi-problem client-- the individual who needs educational
assistance and/or skills training as well as support in dealing
with such issues as "homelessness, drug and alcohol dependency,
abuse, health, child care, and language", conditions which they
are being asked to deal with more often than they had in the
past. For this reason, it is important that the linkage programs
the NJT selects to fund, possess certain characteristics, and
that certain condition be present that are know to be effective
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at addressing the multi-problem client. The important
characteristics and conditions are the following:
A. The Extent to Which JCS can Exert Influence over the Day-to-
Day Operation of the Linkage Program
Allowing JCS, the jobs linkage program management entity, to
intervene in the operation of a program will be beneficial
in the event of unpredicted events; the ability to intervene
can be characterized as allowing for more flexibility and
control in making adjustments to program curricula and
budget, for example, so that services do not have to be
suspended if a problem occurs. This is an important
characteristic relative to the operation of many federal
employment training programs. With many federal employment
training programs, it often took the passage of
Congressional amendments in order to make adjustments in
programs operations. With local control and flexibility,
JCS can intervene immediately, consult with program
administrators, and when possible make necessary
adjustments.
B. Ease of Access to Training Site
A beneficial characteristic of the Manpower programs of the
1960s was that they offered trainees allowances, stipends
and/or vouchers for support goods and services at no or
reduced cost. Vouchers were provided in recognition of the
need to eliminate transportation difficulties to and from
the training site, for example, as a cause of low
attendance, or an expense that would preclude a prospective
applicants' participation. Removing or reducing obstacles
such as travel to and from the training site is an important
condition that jobs linkage programs should possess, if they
are to have an impact on structural unemployment.
C. Skills Training in a Supportive Environment
In the absence of providing training in a supportive
environment, the provision of skills training and/or
education will be insufficient in helping the multi-problem
client take full advantage of the services they are being
provided. In recognition of this, the federal government
created programs in the 1960s which combined education with
support services, subsidies and living allowances. This
combination was found to provide more comprehensive
services, and result in better individual performance.
D. Strength of Relationship Between Collaborating Organizations
A positive relationship between the organizations
collaborating to create a job training linkage program is a
condition that should help the program run as smoothly as
possible. When a good working relationship has been forged,
generally, better communication is facilitated, and program
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goals and expectations are more likely to be shared. The
CETA experience of the 1970s revealed the cost of different
organizations' (or levels of government) not sharing program
expectations and goals. If program goals and expectations
are not shared by collaborating organizations, ultimately
program administrators will be less effective at managing
their programs. Once this happens, the opportunity to
positively impact the lives of the structurally unemployed
enrolled in programs at that time may be lost.
E. Potential Linkage Program Benefits
With any self-improvement activity, it is important for
applicants to know the potential short- and long-term
benefits of completing the activity. In the case of
providing education and skills training to the structurally
unemployed, it is even more important that prospective
trainees are convinced that there are immediate benefits of
completing training. It is also important to convey that
long-term benefits can be achieved through staying in the
program. For this reason, it is important that programs
have role models or a mentoring component so that trainees
"see" how the investment they are making in themselves will
pay off over the long-term.
Unless prospective trainees understand and are convinced of
the higher value of potential program benefits, the
structurally unemployed will not likely enroll in programs.
Also, neighborhood training organizations will have a more
difficult time identifying individuals that could benefit
from their programs offerings if benefits are not clear.
Therefore, potential benefits should be clear and of a
relatively higher value than what would be available to
prospective trainees without the training.
A. JCS Influence
Children's Hospital/English High School: This job creation
program was proceeding according to everyone's expectations
until it was announced that English High School had been
selected to be consolidated with the Jamaica Plain High
School. Initially, program administrators at the hospital
thought that consolidation would mean the end of the
program, because it would make students' travel between the
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school and the hospital very difficult. Another unexpected
event occurred-- the teacher who originally advocated for
the creation of the program was laid off. The program
administrator at the hospital indicated that the fact that
JCS could intervene and help the two organizations manage
these changes meant that services were not disrupted.
Regarding the consolidation of the two schools, JCS
increased the program budget to cover unexpected
transportation costs between the hospital and the new
school, regarding the teacher lay-off, initially, hospital
administrators thought that the discontinuity of a new
program administrator from the school would not settle well
with students, and result in a loss of interest in the
program. But, as the program continued, it became apparent
that the change in personnel was not a factor in program
performance, and the fact that JCS could not prevent this
event from occurring was immaterial.
NETCo/Training, Inc.: An unexpected event also occurred in
the NETCo/Training, Inc. program. In 1989, there was a
strike of NYNEX's unionized telephone workers, including
those employed at the company's Boston office. Unlike in
the Children's Hospital/English High School case, JCS was
not able to intervene and provide any type of assistance
that would influence the necessary parties, the union, in
ways that would minimize any potential negative impact the
strike might have on the jobs linkage effort. At this time,
recruitment for the jobs linkage program had just begun and
all trainees had not been selected. Once the strike was
declared, the union put a hiring freeze in effect. This
meant that all hiring had to be conducted from within the
company. Because of the strike, NETCo experienced a "worker
surplus" in the category of positions for which individuals
enrolled in the jobs linkage program would be trained.
Ultimately, the hiring freeze would mean that the few
individuals who were enrolled in the program before the
strike was declared, would not be eligible for positions
even if they completed training and passed the standardized
test. More importantly, however, the hiring freeze meant
that no one from outside of the company could become
eligible for the entrance into the program-- walk in off the
street and apply for a clerical position, fail the
standardized test, and ask to be admitted to the jobs
linkage program.
As a city agency, JCS has no authority to intervene in
the affairs of a private corporation on behalf of city
residents in such a labor/management dispute. It is the
opinion of the program administrators from Training, Inc.
and NETCo that the national strike of union employees caused
their program to perform so poorly. Each party also
recognized the limits of JCS to intervene in a way that
would have allowed the strike to have had less impact on the
program. This disappointing outcome raises the question of
whether the program was designed poorly to begin with. The
type of obstacles that were present and caused problems,
calls into question the soundness of the NJT's decision to
grant funds to this organization, since they did not
provided trainees with the best combination of services. It
also calls into question whether the organization thoroughly
understood the needs of the population they were targeting--
the structurally unemployed.
B. Ease of Access to Program Site
Children's Hospital/English High School: Initially, access
to the program site was convenient for students because the
high school was located within a few blocks of the hospital.
When the school was consolidated with Jamaica Plain High
School, access between the school and the hospital was a
problem. The fact that the transportation problem was
solved contributed to some degree, to the overall good
performance of the program because once solved, it was one
less issue students had to spend time thinking about as they
pursued the education and other services the program
offered. When JCS increased the program budget, the
hospital was able to provide transportation between Jamaica
Plain High School to the Longwood Medical area so that
services there would not be interrupted. The program
administrator from the hospital indicated that the
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consolidation and the resulting transportation problem posed
a real threat to the program, and unless it had been solved,
fewer students would have remained with the program.
NETCo/Training, Inc.: For the NETCo/Training, Inc. program,
access to the training site was less convenient for'
trainees. Training, Inc. proclaimed that their Washington
Street training facility is a positive feature of their
operation which makes them a prime candidate for developers
and other private institutions to select as a professional
skills training partner in developing a program to fulfill
the city's jobs linkage requirement. Training, Inc. said
that this was a positive feature because their offices are
located near many of the offices of developers and other
private institutions. If this is true, Training, Inc.'s
location is equally inconvenient, for neighborhood residents
to travel to for training classes. The potential for there
to be language, cultural and literacy barriers among the
structurally unemployed is great. For this reason,
intimidation brought on by having to travel to the central
business district may have also served as barriers in the
NETCo/Training, Inc. program. Staff of neighborhood
training organizations raised this same concern prior to the
adoption of the jobs linkage program, and the Mayor agreed
that keeping training activities in the neighborhoods was in
the best interest of the city. Intimidation and the
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inability to gain entrance to the personnel office at NETCo
due to the presence of striking employees, was also
influential factor which did not allow this program to offer
services to more people than it ultimately did.
Based on the Children's Hospital/English High School
experience, it appears as if ease of access to the training
site was influential in overall program performance. The
extent to which access and any transportation problem can be
minimized, will positively contribute to a better overall
performance.
C. Skills Training in a Supportive Environment
Children's Hospital/English High School: The philosophy
behind the program developed by Children's Hospital and
English High School is based on the knowledge and
understanding of the characteristics typically found in the
lives of the structurally unemployed. Program
administrators from both institutions realized that "in many
cases, ... the students [were] shouldering weighty problems
in their personal lives, and school ... simply [was] not a
priority for them" (Children's Today, 10). Program
administrators also thought that "by giving students special
attention that they may not have experienced in the past,
[their] attitudes ... and self-image will be improved"
(Ibid.). The curriculum for this program was developed with
this philosophy in mind. The philosophy was operationalized
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by combining traditional classroom sessions, talks and
lectures given by physicians and other hospital staff, and
another unique feature-- a monthly rotation through one of
four hospital departments. This "integrated" curriculum was
developed into a year-long program which ran concurrent with
the typical public sector academic calendar. Program
administrators at both institutions believed that the
philosophy, as operationalized in the curriculum, would
allow students to "see connections between doing well in
school and doing well in a work atmosphere" (Ibid.). Based
on the following testimony of a student, the curriculum
seems to have been successful at doing achieving that goal:
"Seeing all the directors and administrators together [at a
particular special event] made me realize this was a big
deal. Then when we started our work rounds, I really was
excited." (Ibid., 11).
NETCo/Training, Inc.: NETCo had a less thorough
understanding of who the structurally unemployed were, and
why they needed to be targeted in their program. In their
jobs linkage program proposal, NETCo stated that given that
not everyone in Boston is enjoying economic prosperity,
business must ... extend its hand to the vast numbers
of unemployed and economically disadvantaged who have
been left out of the mainstream of economic opportunity
("New England Telephone Second Chance Program, 1-2).
Even though NETCo recognized that structural unemployment
was a problem in Boston, the approach they selected to
address it was narrowly focused relative to the approach
Children's Hospital and English High School took. An
important difference between the two programs was their
purpose. The purpose of NETCo's partnership with Training,
Inc. was to provide trainees with the skills necessary to
pass the standardized test. Their curriculum incorporates
only the following components:
individualized remedial training in those areas of
weakness identified [in the standardized testing
process], and the staff develops customize modules for
spelling, arithmetic computation, following
instructions, etc. (Ibid.).
It is evident by this description that the purpose of this
program was dramatically different in terms of commitment to
enhancing the employability of trainees, that the purpose of
the Children's Hospital/English High School program. Their
curriculum combined with their inflexible hiring process
(mandatory test), is not supplemented with any formal or
informal support systems that trainees can look to for
assistance. The absence of support services for the multi-
problem client can be a strong negative factor in affecting
their ability to complete the training assignment.
The Children's Hospital/English High School program
took a much more comprehensive view of their task, and
therefore, of the trainees. They did not focus exclusively
on giving students the skills needed to perform duties in
those positions that were unfilled at the hospital. Instead,
they recognized and understood that the students were
lacking more than the appropriate skills. Because of this
level of understanding, program administrators at Children's
Hospital and English High School knew that it would also be
important to find ways to "improve students' attitudes, self
image, and opportunities" and incorporate these methods into
the program curriculum (Children's Today, 10). It is
important to stress that this a fundamental difference in
program purpose. Still, NETCo is "confident that [their]
employment process [passing their standardized test]
identifies those applicants who have the best potential for
successful employment" ("New England Telephone Second Chance
Program", 5). This statement is based on their belief that
"applicants who demonstrate reasonable ability in the areas
[covered on the test] are likely to succeed on the job"
(Ibid.). It is important to note that NETCo supplied no
data to support this belief, and therefore, it is simplistic
to think that this one dimension of an individual will
determine future job performance. Prior to the creation of
the jobs linkage program, the opportunity to become employed
by NETCo ended once an applicant failed the standardized
test. Short of passing the test, there was no other way to
secure a clerical position with this company.
D. Relationship Between Collaborating Organizations
Children's Hospital/English High School: English High
School had established an informal relationship with
Children's Hospital before the jobs linkage collaboration
was forged, and the relationship was very good. The program
administrator from the hospital indicated that they had
always felt that since the school was close by, the hospital
should develop some be involved in some type of outreach
effort that went beyond the provision of medical services--
one that would build on the relationship that had already
been established. The jobs linkage collaboration was
actually facilitated by the original program administrator
from the high school, who had been involved in an externship
at the hospital. During this experience, the teacher was
able to identify career paths that high school students
might like to pursue if they had access to appropriate
training, as well as exposure to a hospital environment.
The fact that the hospital was looking for a way to
become more involved in the activities at the neighboring
school meant that when they were searching for ways to
fulfill their jobs linkage requirement, the best way to
fulfill the requirement presented itself because of the
prior relationship with English High School. It was also
advantageous that the original program administrator from
the school had already established a relationship with
hospital personnel. The fact that a relationship already
existed probably resulted in a minimal amount of time and
energy spent reaching a consensus about program goals,
expectations and the curriculum.
NETCo/Training, Inc.: No relationship existed between NETCo
and Training, Inc. before NETCo received a grant from the
NJT. In order to find Training, Inc., NETCo made a
systematic search for a training organization they could
work with to address their hiring problem. NETCo used the
following criteria to find a professional training
organization:
mission of the organization, population served,
entrance requirements, curriculum, customized training,
location, hours of operation, student/instructor ratio,
expertise of staff, physical plant, cost per student,
placement rate, and hourly wage after graduation
(Ibid., 7).
Tension mounted between the two organizations soon after
they began to design the curriculum for the linkage program.
Tension was not necessarily centered around personalities
involved, or the task at hand. Rather, tension mounted when
staff at Training, Inc. indicated that the program budget
NETCo had developed was too small, and in particular, did
not include sufficient funds for the developmental phases of
the programs wherein the curriculum was to be designed. It
took just under one year to develop the curriculum for this
program. In addition to the fact that the budget was
insufficient, once the curriculum had been designed,
Training, Inc. had to wait several months for payment for
work they had performed in the developmental phases of the
program. Training, Inc. felt that this payment procedure
was "punitive" to them as a non-profit training
organization, and of all of the actors involved in the jobs
linkage effort-- the public sector, the private sector and
non-profit training organizations such as themselves-- they
could least afford to go without payment. This would have
been an appropriate occasion for Training, Inc. to exercise
the forward funding option. Instead, Training, Inc. worked-
out a payment schedule with NETCo, whereby Training, Inc.
could draw on funds directly from NETCo in advance of JCS
sending NETCo their grant award. This arrangement allowed
the burden of delayed payment to shift to NETCo, the private
sector link in this collaboration.
The fact that Training, Inc. and NETCo could make a
satisfactory arrangements without assistance from JCS speaks
to the fact that even though there was no relationship
before the linkage program, good working relationships can
be established after the fact. On the other hand, it is
clear that the fact that Children's Hospital and English
High School had a relationship before their collaboration on
the linkage program, significantly enhanced their program.
However, the Training, Inc./NETCo experience tells us that a
previous relationship is not crucial. Their experience also
illustrate the amount of flexibility organizations have to
craft arrangement that suit changing circumstances.
The strike was also the source of tension between the
two organizations, because neither organization could
control or influence the outcome of that situation. They
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also knew that they could not look to JCS for assistance
with this problem. As time passed, the strike continued.
The first training cycle ended and four people successfully
completed the program, passed the standardized test, and
thereby were eligible for a clerical position with NETCo.
Even though the hiring freeze meant that they could.not be
placed in positions, the program administrator from NETCo
negotiated with the company's personnel department and
convinced them to ignore the hiring freeze and place the few
individuals who had completed the training program and
passed the standardized test, into clerical positions.
E. Potential Program Benefits
Children's Hospital/English High School: As stated above,
the Children's Hospital program targeted "students who
[were] unmotivated by the traditional educational
environment". By providing students with an alternative
educational experience and environment, students had "the
opportunity to learn about career options that [would]
enable them to become economically independent in the
future" and provide them with access to "employment
opportunities that have potential for career growth"
(Children's Today, 2). It is important to underscore that
the level of commitment to the career advancement of the
students that the hospital and school exhibited through this
statement served as a strong incentive for the students, the
structurally unemployed. The hospital and the school's
commitment was operationalized through a program which
provided services that addressed many of the social and
psychological conditions the structurally unemployed face in
a comprehensive manner. According to the program
administrator from the hospital, the program grew in
popularity so much after its first year that students could
no longer select themselves to participate. Starting in the
second year of the program, the school had to assume
responsibility for developing a selection process that would
give all interested candidates an equal chance of
participating.
I would argue that perhaps the most valuable benefit to
students who participated in this program was coming to
realize a greater sense of pride and self-esteem because the
positive motivation engendered by this type of support is
essential to successful job performance. Together,
administrators from the hospital and the school fostered
this in a very unique way. One example of how this was
fostered was allowing the student participate to develop the
application which prospective students would complete to
gain entrance into the program. Students can participate in
such an important activity such as this only if trust has
been established between themselves and both institutions,
and if the students have the confidence to know that they
can perform such an important task. There may be no more
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valuable benefit than motivation and skills training that
can be offered to this particular segment of the workforce,
because the combination "equals" successful job performance.
NETCo/Training, Inc.: Potential benefits provided by NETCo
were not as desireable. According to employees at Training,
Inc., the starting wage rate for the positions in which
trainees would be placed if they successfully completed the
jobs linkage program, and then passed the standardized test,
was minimal given the type of individual who typically
sought this type of training. Staff at Training, Inc. felt
that the starting wage rate was geared toward older women
who came from families where the husband was the primary
wage earner (like so many more women did a generation ago
than do today) where their income was not the only income
supporting a family. The starting wage rate was so low that
Training, Inc. staff asked trainees to seriously consider
whether it was sufficient to support their families. In the
event that the wage was too low, staff urged trainees to try
to identify other sources of income that could supplement
their wages. The staff did tell trainees that if they
performed well on the job and were patient, wages would
increase and their benefit package would improve. Telling
the structurally unemployed to be patient and wait for
someone to judge their performance over time, and possibly,
get a raise and better benefit package, is not a valuable
enough benefit to enroll in the jobs linkage program and re-
take the standardized test. Further, structuring a hiring
proces with so many hurdles as NETCo's does not appear to
take into account what this particular type of trainees need
most-- encouragement and support. Rather, the process seems
weighted with the type of hurdles that give the employer the
assurance that he/she is getting a qualified employee.
While such assurances are important given the financial
investment the employer makes in the process, there are
probably ways that are less taxing on trainees that would
provide the employer with the assurances they need. Re-
evaluating the hiring process would be a good place to start
in an effort to identify less taxing ways to provided
employers with assurances.
Largely due to this experience with NETCO, Training,
Inc. has declined requests from other developers who have
approached them for assistance in developing a training
program for the jobs linkage requirement, because their
starting wages were similarly low. This points out the
problem of a poor match between training program curricula
and area employers needs.
Based on the performances of the first group of
programs funded by jobs linkage money, public officials and
employment training professionals should have a good sense
of how the job training linkage program operates and under
what conditions it is likely to operate best. The
descriptions of the Children's Hospital/English High School
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and NETCo/Training, Inc. experiences provide two detailed
accounts of programs that had varying degrees of success at
enhancing the employability of the some of the city's
structurally unemployed residents, as a result of the
existence or absence of the characteristics or conditions
that can improve upon an organization's ability to deliver
training services.
While the presence of these characteristics and
conditions in job training linkage programs will probably
have an overall positive impact on both the individual
service providers and trainees in the short-term, and entire
job training linkage effort over the long-term, the context
within which the program operates will also influence the
capacity of the neighborhood training organizations to
deliver appropriate training services. This larger context
is the economy and the political and other forces that
intervene in the market. Forces working against the free
working of the market are the need for government to
intervene and create programs and policies that work to
maintain low level of structural and aggregate unemployment;
the existing "crisis" in Boston's employment training
system, as described by the city's employment training
professionals; and the desire for public officials' to
improve the working relationships between the city's
employment training organizations. I would argue that it is
important for public officials to be mindful of each of
these contextual issues and to look for opportunities to
manage each of them in a way that minimizes negative
consequences on the others. I would argue further that
working to positively affect these larger issues can be done
indirectly, using the job training linkage program as a
tool. Ways to use the job training linkage program as a
tool to help positively impact the larger contextual issues
are discussed in the next Chapter.
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POTENTIAL LONG-TERM OUTCOMES
over the long-term, it is likely that Boston's job training
linkage program will yield results similar to those described in
Chapter 2 unless program administrators and neighborhood training
organizations learn from the positive and negative results of the
first group of programs, and where needed, change their current
behavior to reflect the positive characteristics of those
programs. It is also possible that an unpredicted event will
occur that changes' Boston's economic climate. The occurrence of
such an event might cause the NJT to choose to fund different
types of programs than those funded in the first year of the
program, and thereby, influence potential long-term outcomes in a
different way.
The performance of the first thirteen programs funded under
the jobs linkage program was good overall, with six of the eleven
organizations providing training and related services to 100% or
more of the number of people they estimated they would serve. In
addition to the characteristics and conditions identified in
Chapter 2 which can positively impact the job training linkage
program, program performances will also be influenced by
assessing their affect on specific macro level economic issues
over the long-term. These macro level issues include reducing
Boston's structural unemployment rates, remedying the "crisis" in
Boston's employment training system, and the desire to improve
the working relationships between neighborhood training
CHAPTER 3:
organizations. Depending on how public officials and employment
training professionals manage the linkage programs in the future
and make changes in program content and the administrative
structure in accordance with lessons learned, the status of the
large issues may be affected in a positive way.
A. Reducing Structural Unemployment
A review of the program descriptions of the first group of
programs funded with jobs linkage money reveals that each program
was targeted to a segment of the workforce which has experienced
structural unemployment over the years: two programs targeted
youth; four offered English as a Second Language as part of their
curriculum; four provided skills training or upgrading; and, two
others provided trainees with information that could help them
gain access to jobs to which they might not otherwise have
access, due to lack of knowledge of the existence of particular
types of jobs. By having linkage programs target a particular
segment of the workforce that has experienced structural
unemployment, each program sought to eliminate some of the
"essential conditions that must prevail" in order for structural
unemployment to exist, the conditions which Gordon describes in
his book The Goal of Full Employment (see Chapter 1).
In the long-term, if the NJT continues to fund the same type
of programs as those created in the first year of the program,
there could be some positive impact on structural unemployment in
Boston. The potential impact of the job training linkage on
structural unemployment can be illustrated using 1989
unemployment data. For the purpose of illustrating this point,
it will be important to make the following assumptions: (1) the
average or aggregate unemployment rate for the city remain at or
near 3.9%, the rate in 1989; and (2) the capacity of the job
training linkage program remains at roughly 900, the number of
people that was estimated that would be served by the program in
the first year (Geographic Profile of Employment and
Unemployment, Table 23). This second assumption is actually
realistic given recent economic trends. Due to the fact that the
market for commercial real estate is stabilizing relative to the
tremendous growth experienced in this market in the 1980s, jobs
linkage fees collected in the near term may be less than the
amount collected when the market was growing more rapidly. For
example, the following development projects were initially
proposed for the late 1980s and early 1990s, but stabilization of
the market has pushed ground breaking dates further into the
future. BRA staff stress that the following dates are tentative:
TABLE 3.1 Proposed Development Projects
PROSPECTIVE
PROJECT START DATE LINKAGE FEE
1. Prudential 1st qtr 1993 $1,455,000
2. One Lincoln Street 1st qtr 1993 900,000
3. International Place II 2nd qtr 1992 100,000
4. Olmsted Plaza 1st qtr 1990 1,346,000
5. 125 High Street II 2nd qtr 1991 448,268
6. Boston Crossing 3rd qtr 1993 2,840,000
7. Ruggles Center I 2nd qtr 1992 185,000
8. Commonwealth Ctr. 3rd qtr 1994 1,610,000
TOTAL $8,884,268
("Outlook for the Boston Economy" 1990, 30)
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Together, these projects would result in $8.8 million in jobs
linkage fees based on proposed development programs. The fact
that the amount of linkage fees collected may decline in the near
term, supports the assumption that this program has the capacity
to serve only a limited number of people.
Using blacks as a subgroup of Boston's structurally
unemployed workforce, I will illustrate the potential impact the
job training linkage program alone could have over time, if one
makes the two assumptions I have described. In 1989, the
unemployment rate for blacks was 5.5% (Geographic Profile of
Employment and Unemployment, Table 23). Since blacks make up
roughly 11% of the population (which may be a different
proportion than that which they comprise of the city's
workforce), roughly 330 blacks would have to be trained by jobs
linkage programs and placed in newly-created jobs in order to
reduce the unemployment rate of blacks by 1%. I calculated this
figure in the following manner:
the size of the resident workforce in Boston was 303,858 in
1989. Using 11% as an approximation of the proportion of
the work force that blacks comprised in 1989. I determined
that roughly 33,434 blacks made-up the city's resident
workforce. the unemployment rate for blacks was 5.5% in
1989. Five and one half per cent of 33,434 is 1,838, which
would be the number of black residents who were unemployed
in 1989. To reduce the unemployment rate one percent to
4.5%, I multiplied the resident work force figure, 33,434,
by (.045) and the product was 1,504. I then subtracted
1,504 from 1,838 and the difference was 334, or 334 black
residents would have to become employed in Boston, in order
for the unemployment rate of blacks to be reduced 1% to
4.5%. (Ibid.).
It is important to note that if the jobs taken were not new jobs
66
added to the labor market, but instead, were positions already
held by city residents, this would constitute displacement, and
there would be no impact on structural unemployment.
If blacks comprise one third of the total number of people
enrolled in jobs linkage programs, and a high proportion of
blacks, successfully complete jobs linkage programs and are
placed into newly-created jobs, the unemployment rate for blacks
would decrease, and indirectly, structural unemployment could be
positively effected. The potential impact of the job training
linkage program on structural unemployment could be even greater
if one considers that blacks are only one of many sub-group of
the structurally unemployed, and latinos, women, youth, the
physically handicapped, Asian-Americans, etc., are also targets
of programs funded with jobs linkage money. Together, the
various sub-groups comprise close to 100% of all individuals
enrolled in job training linkage programs.
By comparison, in order to reduce the 1989 aggregate
unemployment rate from 3.9% to 2.9%, by any means, roughly 3,000
additional jobs would have to be created and filled by Boston
residents. I calculated this figure using the same principles as
in the last calculation. The only difference was that in this
calculation, I used the 1989 aggregate unemployment of 3.9%.
Since all programs funded with jobs linkage money target the
structurally unemployed,it is unlikely that this program alone
will help reduce aggregate unemployment, especially since the
program has the capacity to serve only 900 people. Therefore, if
the same type of programs are awarded grants as those that were
awarded grants in the first year, then the jobs linkage program
alone has the potential to positively impact the city's aggregate
unemployment rate less than it does the structural unemployment
rates. The linkage program's capacity to have greater impact on
structural unemployment is due to the fact that the structurally
unemployed make up a smaller proportion of the workforce, but
have a higher rate of unemployment relative to the entire
workforce.
B. Remedy the "Crisis"
As indicated in Chapter 1, federal funding for employment
training decreased significantly in the 1980s and private
employers asserted that the content of JTPA-sponsored employment
training programs was inadequate. In addition, the presence of
many more multi-problem clients was more frequent than in recent
years, and neighborhood training organizations had less capacity
to provide these people with comprehensive services. These three
factors resulted in a "crisis" in Boston's employment training
system, which does not allow service providers to adequately
train the city's residents to meet the challenges present in the
available positions in Boston businesses. The job training
linkage program alone cannot remedy this crisis. Nonetheless, it
can have a significant positive impact on some aspects of the
"crisis".
1. Reduction in Federal Funding
The fact that the jobs linkage program exists as an
additional funding source is not sufficient to say that it
alone can remedy the crisis in Boston's employment training
system. The capacity of this program, with its unstable
funding source, to make up the 92% reduction in funding
simply does not exist. Only $2.5 in jobs linkage fees have
been collected by the NJT since the program began in 1986,
and roughly $8.8 million is projected to be collected over
the next several years. Given that the timing of future
jobs linkage payments are subject to an increasingly weaker
commercial real estate market, the $8.8 million should be
considered an optimistic estimate. Another example of the
limited financial capacity of the job training program is a
comparison of the proportion of JCS' operating budget that
jobs linkage fees comprise each year, versus federal
dollars: in FY89, federal JTPA dollars for employment
training totaled $5,468,194 as compared to $1,330,223 from
the NJT (FY89 Annual Report - Mayor's Office of Jobs and
Community Services (Draft Version), 39).
Even though jobs linkage fees cannot replace federal
money dollar for dollar, it appears that management
practices have been improved from having had fewer federal
dollars. Based on the overall good performance of the first
group of programs funded by jobs linkage money, it appears
that public officials have learned how to use significantly
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fewer dollars very effectively. Thirteen unique programs
were funded with $1.2 million, and 60% were able to improve
the qualifications of all of the people they estimated they
would serve. The remainder of the programs fell short of
their original estimate, but nonetheless, made a positive
contribution to the effort of providing skills training to
the structurally unemployed in a supportive environment.
The good performances achieved by the jobs linkage programs
which had significantly fewer financial resources compared
to federally-sponsored efforts, highlights an important
feature of the job training linkage program-- the ability to
be flexible in crafting programs which are controlled by
local officials may be more significant in improving the
qualifications of the structurally unemployed, than having
several millions of dollars which are controlled by the
federal government.
2. Serving the Multi-Problem Client
The capacity of the job training linkage program to serve
the multi-problem client clearly exists. Though, of the
group of organizations selected to create programs in the
first funding cycle, none represented collaborations that
maximized the jobs linkage program's ability to "link"
education and skills training organizations with still
another organization which specializes in the delivery of
social services. An expanded collaboration such as this one
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would work best when there is a demonstrated need for the
provision of additional support services, and neither the
developer or the neighborhood organization providing the
funds or the skills training has the capacity or desire to
provide them. The provision of additional social services
by neighborhood-based or even a city-wide organization could
be very attractive to residents participating in certain job
training linkage programs. Examples of additional support
services are childcare, health services, transitional
housing, or food or meal assistance.
Support for expanding the concept of linkage comes from
a January 1990 report entitled "The Dream Deferred or
Denied?: The Persistence of Family Poverty Amidst Increasing
Affluence in Boston and Massachusetts". The report was
written by Andrew Sum - Center for Labor Market Studies at
Northeastern University, Tom Maher - Community Jobs
Collaborative, and Ted Murphy - JFK Family Service Center.
The report summarized the findings of a household survey
conducted of 32 census tracts in Boston where poverty occurs
more frequently than in any other locations in the city.
The purpose of the survey was to "learn more about the
conditions and perceptions of residents regarding their
economic status, ... as well as their desires for job-
related services" (Sum, Maher and Murphy, 4). The survey
concluded that
locating more education, training, and child care
facilities in or near the neighborhoods ... and
providing subsidized child care services to
participants are likely to strengthen access by
neighborhood residents to programs and increase the
utilization of such services (Ibid., 11).
Stretching the concept of linkage to include additional
activities may result in the NJT making fewer, but larger
grants than were made in the first cycle of funding. But in
order to more full utilize the flexibility inherent in this
program, more expanded collaborations should be considered.
Collaborations might better address the concerns of the
multi-problem client, and thereby help remedy the crisis in
employment training.
3. Program Content
For the purpose of this study, it will not be possible to
determine how well the first group of programs supported
with linkage money were able to prepare residents for
positions with Boston's employers. Information on placement
rates and on-the-job performance of individuals who
completed the first jobs linkage programs, was not available
for the purpose of this study. It will therefore be
difficult to surmise how well job training linkage programs
prepare people over the long-term. In the absence of such
information, I can only speculate that NJT and JCS selected
these particular programs based on knowledge of what type of
skills and training services were in demand in 1989, and
72
were projected to be in demand in the future. To the extent
that funding decisions were based on such knowledge, and
they should be, will continue to be over the long-term, JCS
and the NJT will be making good choices about how to
allocate jobs linkage funds.
4. Job Creation versus Job Contribution Grants
The potential impact of the jobs linkage program on
remedying the "crisis" in employment training in Boston over
the long-term, could also be influenced by the number of job
creation proposal (Children's Hospital/English High School)
as opposed to the number of jobs contribution grants
(NETCo/Training, Inc.) that occur in each funding cycle. The
selection of either option has different implications for
the job training linkage program over the long-term. Staff
at JCS indicate that the fact that the NJT encourages
private developers to select the job contribution grant
option over the job creation option, reflects the need to
secure financial support for existing neighborhood training
organizations for current and future programs. Given that
more job contribution grants are selected than job creation
proposals, it appears as if the need to secure funding for
current and future programs takes precedence over the
development of innovative approaches to employment training
which can be achieved through the job creation option. JCS
staff have also indicated that developers of most projects
which are subject to the jobs linkage requirement prefer the
job creation option over making a jobs contribution grant
because it affords them more "PR" opportunities. Staff also
state that unless a job creation program proposal is truly
unique, or, a particular development project has a very high
profile, JCS counsels the developer to select the job
contribution grant option. Such counseling runs contrary to
the jobs linkage program goal of creating innovative
approaches to employment training that would allow
neighborhood training organizations to better serve the
multi-problem client, and thereby, address the "crisis".
JCS explains this preference for jobs contribution grants
over jobs creation programs by pointing to the drastic
reductions in federal support for employment training
programs in recent years, and the resulting increased
competition for funds among the city's employment training
organizations.
This preference for continuing to fund existing
programs instead of giving developers the opportunity to
create new, innovative program, represents under-utilization
of one of the features of the jobs linkage program that is
unique-- the chance to explore new approaches to employment
training. While the need to "shore-up and financially
stabilize" the neighborhood training organizations is
important, the NJT's preference for contributions suggests
that programs are being perpetuated without adequate
critique of their contribution to the overall training
system. It also suggests that resources available in the
private sector are not being fully mobilized to address
employment training issues.
JCS staff also point to the recent stabilization of the
commercial development market as justification for wanting
to fund existing programs with jobs contribution grants,
because they do not want begin supporting new programs whose
future could be jeopardized because the availability of jobs
linkage feeds is uncertain in the future. But, if there are
more job contribution grants than job creation programs over
the long-term, the city may not learn how to better design
and administer employment training programs to address the
specific condition in Boston, and the "crisis" the city
currently faces with regard to its employment training
system.
C. Improving the Working Relationships between Employment
Training Organizations
1. Collaboration between Neighborhood Training
Organizations
A review of the first thirteen programs funded with jobs
linkage money reveals that 70% represented a collaboration
of two or more organizations in the development of an
education or skills training program. Short of establishing
a centrally-located employment training clearinghouse, an
idea that was discussed before the jobs linkage program was
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adopted, encouraging neighborhood training organizations to
work collaboratively as they participate in this program
over the long term, may be a more politically viable
response to the need to provide more comprehensive
employment training services to the structurally unemployed.
Given the Mayor's previous commitment to maintain a.
decentralized training system which is based in the
neighborhoods, however, JCS must play a more significant
coordination role which incorporates a long-range planning
function.
Making collaboration a job training linkage program
goal in the face of a sharp reduction, in federal funding
for employment training activities, could result in a few
different outcomes over the long-term. Initially, attrition
might set in and multiple program offerings on the same
topics might be reduced.
On the other hand, developing collaborations will
foster competitiveness on a system-wide scale because the
city's employment training resources are scarce, and several
organizations will be competing for less money than has ever
been available. In addition, collaborations may be
difficult to develop because relationships between
organization will necessarily change due to the competitive
funding climate. Staff at JCS have indicated that the
competitive funding environment has already resulted in some
unfortunate consequences. For example, one training
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organization was encouraged that a developer had approached
them to inquire about providing assistance in the
development of a job creation program. When the developer
selected another organization instead, the original training
organization threatened to sue because their expectations
had been aroused and they had invested time and energy in
developing a program. In this case, the job training
linkage program has not caused relationships between
organizations to improve.
Another potential long-term outcome of making
collaboration a goal is that "consortiums" of organizations
may develop over time. While such a trend may be a positive
outcome because it would signify that the appropriate
combinations of services is being packaged into innovative
programs, it could also further heighten competitiveness
between training organizations. Ont the other hand, if the
consortiums develop good reputations and become
institutionalized over time, their success could cause some
organizations to go out of business. Consortiums of
services could also extend the life of some organizations in
the long run. Theoretically, they could also help the
entire training system run more efficiently because limited
resources would be shared and used in a fashion that
maximized their impact on the structurally unemployed.
From the performances of the first group of programs funded
by linkage money, as well as from previous federal efforts,
JCS has learned that collaborations worked best when they
possessed the following characteristics: where skills were
provided in a supportive environment; where JCS can
influence the daily operation of a program; where an
informal relationship exists prior to the start of the
program; the training site and the place of origin of
students is in close proximity; and, where both present and
future program benefits are of value to the trainee. If JCS
selects programs which have these characteristics over the
long-term, the results discussed above, both positive and
negative, will probably result because the arrangements
between individual training organizations, and between
training organizations and JCS, constitute a "marketplace"
where scarce funds are distributed between different
parties. The competitive spirit that will emerge will
probably make training organizations develop more unique
programs in order to secure funding. A potential dilemma
for JCS is that through the job training linkage program,
neighborhood non-profit organizations are being asked to
shift their behavior from that of a grant recipient to a
mode where grants are distributed according to "market"
criteria. Such a change in philosophy may be difficult for
some training organizations to make.
2. Stabilize Neighborhood Training Organizations
Financially stabilizing neighborhood training organizations
in the face of dramatic federal cuts in funding was an
implicit jobs linkage program goal since 1986. As such, the
decision to create a new job training effort, the linkage
program, was not based on the results of a "rational",
systematic assessment of the city's employment training
system and how this new program could contribute to the
city's efforts. Instead, the basis for the decision to
create the program was more heavily weighted toward
political considerations than it was toward an understanding
of what would soon be the cause of a "crisis"-- what does a
92% reduction mean for the future of Boston's employment
training system?
Prior to the development of either the housing or the
job training linkage program in Boston, the general concept
of linkage and its ability to complement the city's effort
to address the specific issue of affordable housing, was
thoroughly studied by an advisory group. The advisory
group's recommendation to develop a housing linkage program
was made only after research had been conduced, testimony
had been given by housing expert, and discussion and debate
had taken place on all sides of this new issue. The
components of the advisory group's final report included:
1. Description of the city's existing affordable
housing stock.
2. Existing housing assistance programs supported by
federal, state and local resources.
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3. A review of public/private partnerships in the
construction of affordable housing that were known
to have worked.
This data was a vital part of the deliberations about how a
housing linkage program could impact Boston because the data
revealed the city's existing capacity to produce affordable
housing. Without this type of specific knowledge of
existing capacity, a proposal for a new linkage program, for
either housing or jobs, would have been created in a vacuum,
without full understanding of the existing system they were
trying to improve.
The type of systematic effort undertaken to assess
Boston's ability to construct affordable housing was not
done prior to the creation of the jobs linkage program.
City official believed they already possessed the relevant
information on the health and capacity of local training
organizations to offer the types of services a jobs linkage
program would require. Therefore, only a cursory review of
existing employment training organizations was made. With
this limited information, and city officials concluded that
Boston's training organizations had adequate program
offerings and were otherwise poised to meet the challenges
that linkage presented. Implicitly, this means that city
officials believed they knew what types of challenges a jobs
linkage program would present. City officials believed that
the most important issue facing the training organizations
at this time was the 92% reduction in federal funding, not
whether these organizations had the capacity to support a
new program or what future institutional arrangements within
the job training system might be. Therefore, city officials
concluded that the most important thing they could do was
"shore-up and financially stabilize" the training
organizations throughout the city, so they would remain in
business.
Because of the leveling off of growth in the commercial
real estate market, those training organizations whose
operations may have been prolonged by a jobs linkage grant,
may begin to experience the same type of instability that
was prevalent in the middle 1980s when federal funding
declined. Stability, therefore, while an important long-
term goal for the job training linkage program, in reality
may only be a short term condition. It is ironic that the
lack of adequate study and long-term planning for the city's
entire employment training system, and the failure to
identify beforehand, the potential of a jobs linkage program
to make a positive contribution to the future of the system,
may result in a recurrence of instability. From the
beginning, the goal of the jobs linkage program was to
"shore-up and financially stabilize" the operation of
neighborhood training organizations in the face of a 92%
decline in federal funding. It is clear that this program
alone does not have the capacity to do that, and it is
unfortunate that a systematic assessment was not made of the
81
city's training system and the potential impact of this
program was not determined so that realistic expectations
about its potential to stabilized neighborhood training
organizations could have been established.
3. Research Activities
Only one out of thirteen organizations funded by jobs
linkage money in the program's first year was a research
study which sought to analyze an important workforce issue.
The $15,000 grant made to Parent's United for Childcare
represented only 1.2% of all grant awards in the 1989
funding cycle. The importance of the job training linkage
program's research capacity in the effort to improve
relationships between training organizations in the city is
that, unlike with JTPA money, linkage funds are flexible
enough to be used to conduct research which can offer
valuable information and facilitate better understanding of
important issues effecting the workforce, and indirectly
effect the content of programs funded by jobs linkage money.
The fact that a study was conducted on the issue of
childcare might lend support to the idea that individual
linkage programs should be stretched to include
organizations that offer childcare services. If this unique
characteristic of the jobs linkage program is not more fully
utilized, at a minimum, policy makers may be less well
informed about how intensely certain issues impact the
structurally unemployed, and the labor market in general.
Indirectly, inadequate information could lead to funding
decisions which are politically expedient. The value of
research activities is in part illustrated by the following
childcare survey findings:
-the available supply [of affordable childcare
services] could only accommodate 5% of the school-aged
population in the city;
-the data was inconclusive in establishing a patter of
usage or demand by families across the city;
-if quality, affordable after-school childcare were
available, 15% of the parent [who responded to the
survey] not now in school or training would begin such
education (Challenges Facing Boston Families: The Need
for School-Age Child Care 1987 1,3).
These types of survey findings are of value to jobs linkage
program administrators as they look to the future and make
changes in their program to reflect the changes in the needs
of the population they serve.
As Boston's economy changes over time and new workforce
issues emerge, it would be useful if issues that impact the
workforce could be studied and the data used to inform
decisions about what the content of training programs should
be and which programs the NJT should fund year to year. If
care is not taken to study the impact of pressing labor
market issues, such as childcare, on the structurally
unemployed in particular, ultimately the jobs linkage
program may become less and less effective over time. It is
important to remember that one of the strengths of the jobs
linkage approach to training, is the ability to target
scarce resources precisely toward those obstacles to
employment which the structurally unemployed face. If
program administrators and employment training professionals
do not understand the various phenomena effecting segments
of the labor market whose skills they are working to
upgrade, they will not be able to advocate effectively and
secure the limited resources available in the city for
employment training, and with them, work to eliminate the
structural impediments to employment. Understanding
structural impediments is very important because only then
will program administrators realize their "cost" to the
structurally unemployed in terms of energy, self-esteem,
time, etc., if they are not reduced or eliminated. Most
importantly, however, an approach to employment training
that begins with an understanding of issues facing the
population to be served, will make program administrators
develop realistic expectations about long-term outcomes and
see where the real opportunities exist for the jobs linkage
program to impact target populations.
Data supplied by research conducted with jobs linkage
money would also be useful to private industry, especially
as they try to accommodate an increasingly diverse
workforce. The implications of such issues as "Workforce
2000", the term used to describe the dramatic growth in
numbers of people in the US workforce who are not of western
european descent, is one example of an issue that will be
important for private industry to understand over the long-
term. An aspect of this topic could be the focus of a study
funded with jobs linkage money.
If research activities are deemed only marginally
important over the long term, and designating 1.2% of the
total jobs linkage budget to this activity appears to be
marginal, there may be missed opportunities to recommend
public policy initiatives and prescriptive measures that
directly address pressing labor market issues and therefore
address the "crisis" in the employment training system.
This Chapter consisted of a discussion of how the
economic and some of the over-arching issues surrounding
Boston's employment training sector relate to the operation
of this unique employment training program. Public
officials, in consultation with the relevant parties, must
decide to what degree this program should be used to help
manage these contextual issues. With this public management
task in mind, in the next Chapter, I will identify ways to
more fully utilize the program in the future so that the
Boston's structurally unemployed residents will reap the
greatest positive benefits.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Boston's job training linkage program stands as a new model of
how to fund and provide employment training and related support
services to the structurally unemployed. The characteristic of
the model that distinguishes it from the recent federal
employment training initiatives, the JTPA, is that the city's
developers and employment training professionals unite to create
unique programs that address the specific conditions of the
structurally unemployed in the city. In addition, the Boston
jobs linkage model emphasizes local control, flexible
programming, research capacity, and less "punitive" funding
measures. Indirectly, these characteristics also allow the jobs
linkage program to be used as a tool to impact larger, macro-
level issues which needs to be addressed in Boston. These
include structural unemployment, the "crisis" in the employment
training system, and improving the working relationships among
the neighborhood training organizations, the service providers.
This study has also identified the characteristics and
conditions that should be present in individual jobs linkage
programs if they are to have maximum impact on upgrading the
skill level of the structurally unemployed and be able to offer
the types of support that will help the structurally unemployed
gain self esteem and confidence in their ability to participate
in the workforce. The individual program characteristics and
conditions are the following:
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CHAPTER 4:
1. The extent to which JCS can exert influence over the
day-to-day operation of the program;
2. Ease of access to the training site;
3. Providing skills training in a supportive environment
4. Strength of relationship between collaborating
organizations; and
5. Potential program benefits
Recognizing that the linkage mechanism is a new model for
funding and delivering job training and related social services,
is an important realization. Given this, there are still areas
where more energy could be spent to ensure that future jobs
linkage programs perform as well as those that operated in the
first funding cycle, and that the unique characteristics of this
new model will be more fully utilized and reflect the current
demand for particular types of training. My recommendations for
ensuring that programs continue to perform well and maximize the
opportunities that the unique program characteristics present,
will be offered in the form of policy implications for the three
central parties that play a role in the operation of the jobs
linkage program.
Policy Implications
The Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services (JCS): As the
overall jobs linkage program manager, JCS should play an
increasingly more prominent role in coordinating jobs linkage
program activities and disseminating information to all program
participants than they did during the first year of the program.
Given that the city's employment training system will be a
decentralized one, with employment training activities taking
place in neighborhood-based organizations, JCS should assume more
responsibility for coordinating activities between organizations
and disseminating relevant program information. To a large
extent, the future success of this new model will be dependent
upon all parties having access to up-to-date program information.
Currently, many of the city's neighborhood training
organizations are not aware of the jobs linkage program's
potential benefits, and how they compare more favorably to
federal training programs. The Director of one well established
and successful neighborhood training organization interviewed for
this study, was aware of the jobs linkage program, but did not
know specifically how her organization could participate. The
director further stated that while she was pleased to learn of a
new program with an independent funding source, she was doubtful
that there was sufficient staff time available to carefully study
the program requirements in an effort to determine if their
organization's program offerings could be modified to meet the
more flexible requirements of the jobs linkage program.
To assist in the important task of disseminating information
to neighborhood training organizations, JCS should consider
"linking" themselves with the entire system of training
organizations through a computer network. The computer network
could serve not only as a data base of information on available
training services for individuals or employers seeking this type
of information. It could also serve as a channel through which
announcements and various program updates could be delivered. A
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less expensive and less formal means of carrying out this same
function would be through a quarterly newsletter, or a series of
regularly scheduled public hearings. This recommendation has
significant financial implications which could be analyzed in a
research study funded by jobs linkage money.
An equally important role for JCS to play in the future will
be is that of the provider of technical assistance to
neighborhood training organizations to help them develop the
types of programs that would meet linkage program goals.
Carrying out this function is important because many employment
training service providers feel constrained in their ability to
create and operated programs that differ from those they've
created according to JTPA program guidelines. A top official at
JCS stated that many neighborhood training organizations have
relied almost exclusively on federal funding to operate the
majority of their programs. Restrictions in federal guidelines
for program design, funding and performance criteria have caused
neighborhood training organizations to structure their program
offerings around JTPA's specific requirements (The Job Training
Partnership Act, 2). Over the years, this has meant that program
offerings have not necessarily reflected the labor market's
demand for particular training services, but instead, have
reflected an organization's need to structure programs in a way
that would satisfy the requirements of their federal funding
award. The official at JCS stated that neighborhood training
organizations are so geared toward JTPA program requirements that
when they are presented with a new approach to employment
training, such as a linkage, they will not necessarily support it
unless they are provided with financial support, equipment and
other types of technical assistance so that they will be able to
weather the transition from JTPA requirements to the more
flexible approach required by the job training linkage program.
Currently, these transitional types of support are not available
for neighborhood organizations, and assistance from JCS on how
the transitions could be made would be of great assistance.
In conjunction with the two recommendations just made, JCS
should study the long-term implications of the trend toward
selecting a greater number of job contribution grants versus
creation proposals. Even though there is a dire need for
financial support, which job contributions grants provide,
allowing more job creations proposals to be developed over the
long-term, will have the positive impact of drawing the private
sector into the process of developing solutions to this important
social welfare issue, much more than they would been if they
simply donated funds and didn't become involved in how it would
be spent. Since job creation programs offer developers greater
"PR" opportunities than job contribution grants, it is probable
that developers will be more likely to invest energy into the
development of job creation programs, and more than likely,
develop better programs. All participants have the potential to
benefit if JCS begins to promote the selection of a greater
number of job creation programs in each funding cycle.
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Neighborhood Training Organizations: Given the competitive
funding environment within which job training activities now
occur in Boston, it would behoove neighborhood training
organizations to be as well informed about the availability of
financial resources from different sources, for their training
programs, as well as any technical assistance that may be
available to upgrade the skill level of their staffs. Knowledge
of and the attainment of both types of resources will assist
individual organizations compete more successfully in the
competitive funding environment in the long run. In addition,
rather than waiting to be approached by developers who must
fulfill the jobs linkage requirement, neighborhood training
organizations should participate in more aggressive manner, and
be forthright about their role in the operation of this program.
This can be accomplished by approaching developers with the
intention of convincing them that their organization offers
resources that can be used in the creation of a jobs linkage
programs. However, neighborhood training organizations can only
market their training services in this manner if they are well
informed about development activity city-wide, and if they have
sufficient equipment and staff resources to bring to bear. There
is evidence that such a more "entrepreneurial" approach to
providing these services is already being taken by some of the
city's training organizations. For example, a staff member at
one of Boston's oldest employment training organizations stated
that given current funding restrictions and the competitiveness,
they will have to begin charging fees to private industry for
training services, and in general, become more entrepreneurial,
in order to survive.
Along with being well informed about the availability of
resources, neighborhood training organizations should inquire as
to why there has been no re-evaluation of the jobs linkage
statute, as is permitted in Article 26B. Under section 26B-3, it
is stated that
The formula (amount and rate of payment) for the Jobs
Contribution Grant ... shall be subject to recalculation
three (3) years after the effective date of this provision
and every three (3) years thereafter. ... based on a
consideration of the following
(i) Economic trends measured in terms of, including by not
limited to, development activity, commercial rents per
square foot, employment growth, and inflation rates.
(ii) Employment trends measured in terms of, including by
not limited to, unemployment rate, and statistics on
job training programs.
The resulting analysis will determine the changes in the
City's employment training needs and the continuing ability
of new, large-scale development to assist in meeting the
employment training needs of the City. (pp 3,4).
According to staff at JCS, this option has not been exercised.
This is curious given the changes in the city's development
climate. Neighborhood training organizations should push for
such a re-evaluation as part of JCS' system-wide assessment. A
re-evaluation would be a good opportunity to formalize
discussions about the future of Boston's employment training
system and the jobs linkage program in particular, in a way that
was not done before the jobs linkage program was initially
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adopted.
The Private Sector: Because the larger, most visible private
sector employers in Boston are generally those that will be
subject to the jobs linkage requirement, they will necessarily be
the beneficiaries of a well-performing job training linkage
program. For this reason, they should assume more responsibility
for shaping the future of the program. In addition, it is
important that the private sector play a larger, more influential
role because of their critique of JTPA-sponsored programs. The
linkage mechanism draws private industry into a role that has
traditionally been assumed by the public sector, and by requiring
private developers to create training programs or donate funds to
pay for training efforts, the city is asking them to help fill
the gap left by a decline in federal financial and management
support. Nonetheless, employment training professionals indicate
that providing adequate services to the structurally unemployed
is an uphill battle. If JTPA programs truly are inadequate, then
the private sector should be more willing to do even more than
fulfill jobs linkage requirements to help develop effective
approaches to job training.
The private sector can begin to assume a greater amount of
responsibility in this area by sharing techniques or unique
approaches to training that have worked in-house. The private
sector can also offer in-kind contributions, such as office space
which could be used for training activities, and staff time which
could be used to work with public officials and training
organizations to identify additional funding sources for training
activities, as a show a more serious commitment this issue.
Because they do not, there appears to be a "cultural lag" between
what has traditionally been a government function and will
increasingly become a task for which the private sector must
assume a greater amount of responsibility.
Perhaps the most influential role the city's larger private
employers can play is that of providing the leadership that is
required to make employment training a neighborhood and a city-
wide priority (Challenges Facing Boston Families: The Need for
School-Age Child Care, 13). Before the jobs linkage program was
adopted, city officials characterized private sector involvement
in the linkage effort as a
significant step beyond the corporate philanthropy that has
underwritten various social program. Rather, these
partnerships, have evolved as acknowledgement that the
health of the city's corporate community is linked to the
well-being of the city's residents and their communities and
vice versa (The Linkage Between Downtown Development and
Neighborhood Housing).
Given the reduction in growth in the commercial real estate
market since this program was adopted, it is appropriate for this
spirit to be rekindled so that the private sector can work with
public officials and employment training professionals to develop
new strategies for delivering adequate employment training and
related social services to Boston residents.
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